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Preserving Free Speech in a Global
Courtroom: The Proposed Hague
Convention and the First Amendment
Sarah Hudleston
The United States is one of forty-seven countries currently
in the process of negotiating and drafting a convention dealing
with the jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments
across international boundaries.' Because the United States is
not, and has never been, a party to a treaty or international
agreement dealing with the enforcement of judgments from
foreign nations,2 and because of the recent growth of global
trade and commerce, 3 there is a national push4 for the adoption
of the proposed Hague Convention on International Jurisdiction
and the Effects of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
("Hague Judgments Convention"). Proponents believe the treaty
will foster increased international business and provide uniform
rules for parties engaged in worldwide transactions.5
1. See Hague Conference on Private International Law available at http:l
www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2000). On October 30,
1999, the Special Commission adopted the preliminary draft of the Hague
Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters [hereinafter Hague Convention]. See id. The Diplomatic
Conference that was to convene in October 2000 will now meet in two sessions
beginning in June of 2001. See id.
2. See Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law to Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition/Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 7, 8 (1998).
3. See generally Patrick Lane, Survey, World Trade, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998,
at 1 (showing that in the last fifty years global trade has increased sixteen fold);
Symposium, Trade Policy and Trade Politics, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 281, 283
(1993) (stating world trade has grown fifty percent faster than the global economy).
4. See Elizabeth Neff, Treaty Aims to Ease Actions Against Foreign
Defendants, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, September 20, 1999, at 1. A 1999
conference of the U.S. delegates to the Hague Judgments Convention at the Chicago
Bar Association exemplifies practitioners' desire to see the Hague Treaty go into
effect to help their clients collect on judgments against foreign defendants. See id.
5. See Edward C. Y. Lau, Update on the Hague Convention on the Recognition
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Though American businesses and interests favor having
U.S. judgments enforced systematically across the globe, the
responsibility of enforcing foreign court rulings domestically
could erode constitutional protections. The U.S. Constitution
provides fundamental guarantees of liberties and rights that
may not be present in the legal systems of various member
states of the Hague Conference. As a result, the decisions of
their courts would not reflect these legal requirements. Thus,
enforcing some foreign judgments could require U.S. courts to
contravene constitutional mandates and limitations including
the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech and the
press.6 Notably, a public policy exception to enforcement exists
which allows a court to refuse to recognize a foreign judgment
that is "manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the
state addressed."7 In light of the foreign affairs concerns
encouraging narrow and infrequent application of such a
potential loophole,8 courts may be encouraged and may choose to
systematically recognize foreign judgments rendered under
standards unacceptable to First Amendment jurisprudence.
This Note analyzes the potential requirements and
applications of the Hague Judgments Convention, focusing on
the enforcement of foreign judgments that offend American
notions of free speech and press. Part I outlines the evolution
and current state of U.S. law on the enforceability of foreign
judgments. Next, Part I describes the Constitutional law
governing defamation actions and two recent British libel
judgments brought before U.S. courts by litigants seeking
enforcement. It then introduces the relevant portions of the
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 14 (2000);
see also infra note 31 (emphasizing the professional support of the Judgments
Convention in the United States).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging
freedom of speech or of the press"). This liberty is considered as essential to the
search for truth, self-expression, and democratic government and an enlightened
and free populace. See, e.g., Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-87 (1963) (describing the various theories that
underlie the constitutional protection of free expression).
7. Hague Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [hereinafter Hague Judgments
Convention] art. 28, para. l(f), available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/
jdgm.html (last visited October 15, 2000).
8. The international affairs issues of national sovereignty and cooperation
among nations encourage the U.S. government to subordinate some of its interests
in the name of political compromise and for the creation of a successful treaty. See
infra part III.A. (mentioning this potential limiting of courts' discretion to refuse
judgments).
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proposed Hague Judgments Convention. Part II explains the
constitutional significance of the U.S. treaty power and First
Amendment jurisprudence standards. Part III discusses the
implications of enforcement rules based on international
standards instead of domestic law. It then examines different
ways courts may treat foreign libel cases or other judgments
where liability is based on the defendant's speech. Further, it
asserts that the First Amendment must be considered in
assessing enforcement of these foreign judgments. Part IV
advocates for a balancing test that considers both the trade
relations and speech interests at stake. This part uses the two
British libel judgments as models for when a court should and
should not enforce judgments that would be inconsistent with
First Amendment standards. This Note concludes that in order
to meaningfully effectuate the Hague Judgments Convention
courts must enforce foreign speech-related judgments unless
enforcement directly implicates U.S. interests and creates a
significant burden on free speech.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
A. UNITED STATES RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
1. Common Law Comity Doctrine
Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution requires recognition and enforcement of judgments
among the several states, it does not apply to judgments of
courts in foreign countries. 9 Thus, when a party seeks to enforce
a foreign judgment neither state nor federal courts must
recognize decisions rendered abroad. In the 1895 case, Hilton v.
Guyot, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the common law
doctrine of comity guides such determinations. 10 Lower courts
have described this principle as a rule of practice, convenience,
and understanding, used to facilitate and express international
9. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
10. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (evaluating traders from a
French company attempted to enforce French judgments against U.S. merchants).
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cooperation between the tribunals of various nation states." In
the Hilton case, the Court laid out the federal standard for
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments that focused
on assessing the adequacy of the procedural safeguards of the
adjudicating forum.12 The decision sets out five main elements
to establish a prima facie case for enforcement of a foreign court
judgment:
1. The foreign judgment must have been final and complete;
2. The competent court had personal jurisdiction;
3. The competent court had subject matter jurisdiction;
4. The defendant had timely and proper notice of the proceedings and
an opportunity to defend himself,
5. The courtroom proceedings were of a civilized jurisprudence
recorded formally and clear.1
3
This prima facie case of recognition could be overcome by
showing fraud, prejudice, or other compelling reasons.' 4 The
Hilton case also required reciprocity, such that a court would
enforce a judgment only if the country in which the foreign court
sat would similarly enforce a judgment from a U.S. court.' 5
Courts have since discredited this part of the ruling, as now
reciprocity is not necessary in most jurisdictions. 6
2. Enforcement as a Matter of State Law and the Uniform
Money-Judgments Recognition Act
States courts have always determined their own standards
for enforcement of foreign judgments, thus Hilton only applied
in federal courts. After the Supreme Court decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, state common law also controlled in
federal courts as well as state jurisdictions for questions of
11. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440
(3d Cir. 1971).
12. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03.
13. William Sturm, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 95 COM. L. J. 200, 204
(1990).
14. See id. at 205.
15. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 228.
16. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (court
refused to require reciprocity in an action to enforce a tribal court judgment); Tahan
v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that the logical rule is for
courts to refrain from imposing reciprocity requirements); Tonga Air Servs., Ltd. v.
Fowler, 826 P.2d. 204, 209 (Wash. 1992) (holding that reciprocity is not required in a
contract action); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6, cmt. k
(1971).
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recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 17 As a result,
federal district courts looked to the law of the state in which
they sat and did not directly apply Hilton, as it was part of the
"federal common law" that Erie deemed inapplicable in federal
diversity suits. 1 8
Leaving enforcement determination to state law means
there is currently no uniform standard. Therefore, parties to a
suit may theoretically face different results depending on which
state or federal jurisdiction is the chosen forum. In practice,
however, because state courts and legislatures have prescribed
similar rules for assessing foreign judgment recognition, some
consistency has developed.1 9 For example, twenty-nine states
and the District of Columbia adopted the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("Foreign Money-Judgments
Act") that prescribes criteria for recognition and enforcement
similar to the analysis proposed by the Hilton decision. 20 Under
the Foreign Money-Judgments Act, except as set out in section
four, any final and conclusive foreign judgment is to be given
full faith and credit, and thus enforced in the same way that
judgments of sister states are enforced. 2' Section four describes
grounds for non-recognition stating that a court must not
recognize a judgment issued by a court that did not have subject
matter or personal jurisdiction, or that was rendered under a
system that did not provide due process of law or was not
impartial. 22 Beyond these requirements, the state court has
17. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (tort action in which
the plaintiffs success depended on whether the court applied state or federal law).
18. Id. at 78. Prior to this decision federal courts had applied "federal common
law" to diversity suits (where the court has jurisdiction by virtue of the parties being
citizens of different states) instead of the law of the state in which the courts sat.
This led to a concern about forum shopping by plaintiffs and differing results in
cases based on the same cause of action depending on whether the plaintiff chose
federal or state court. See id. at 74-75; Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965)
(clarifying the two purposes of the Erie rule-limiting forum shopping and avoiding
inequities).
19. See Linda Silberman, Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Country
Judgments in the United States, 624 PLI/Lit 323, 325-26 (2000).
20. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263
(1962) [hereinafter Foreign Money-Judgments Act].
21. See id. § 2-4 at 264-72. "Except as provided in section 4, a foreign judgment
meeting the requirements of section 2 is... enforceable in the same manner as the
judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit." Id. § 3 at 265.
22. See id. § 4(a) at 268.
A foreign judgment is not conclusive if (1) the judgment was rendered
under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process of law; (2) the foreign
20011
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discretion to decline recognition if the defendant did not have
sufficient time to defend herself, the ruling was procured by
fraud, the substantive claim on which the judgment is based is
"repugnant to the public policy of the state,"23 the judgment
conflicts with another conclusive judgment, the foreign
proceeding contravened a prior agreement between the parties
regarding dispute resolution, or the trial court was a seriously
inconvenient forum.2 4 Those states that have not formally
adopted the Foreign Money-Judgments Act generally apply the
same principles.25
It is important to note that recognition and enforcement of
judgments under the Foreign Money-Judgments Act are not
synonymous but tend to overlap in application.26 Recognition
occurs when the U.S. court finds that the subject matter of the
foreign case has been decided and cannot be litigated further.2 7
Enforcement occurs when the party seeking to effectuate the
judgment is granted the relief sought. 28 The Foreign Money-
Judgments Act covers both issues, yet it does not provide
explicit directions for actual enforcement. States must therefore
apply their own procedural rules for the enforcement of sister
state judgments (or those entitled to full faith and credit).29
Because not all states have adopted the Foreign Money-
Judgments Act or other identical standards regarding the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and because
court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or (3) the
foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Id.
23. See infra part I.B.2 for two British cases that were declined enforcement
under this exception. For cases rejecting the public policy exception as a bar to
enforcement, see, e.g., S.W. Livestock Trucking Co. v. Hargrove, 169 F.3d 317 (5th
Cir. 1999) (Mexican judgment based on loan agreement despite the fact that the
agreement violated Texas law); McCord v. Jet Spray Int'l Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436 (D.
Mass. 1994) (difference in law regarding at-will employment contracts not sufficient
to preclude enforcement of Belgium judgment).
24, See id. § 4(b) at 268. A few states that have adopted the act continue to
include reciprocity as a ground for discretionary denial of recognition or
enforcement. See Silberman, supra note 19, at 328. See supra notes 15-16 and
accompanying text for a discussion of reciprocity.
25. See Michael Traynor, An Introductory Framework for Analyzing the
Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters: U.S. and European Perspectives, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP.
L. 1, 5 (2000).
26. See Sturm, supra note 13, at 200.
27. See id.
28. See id. For the purposes of this note, the terms will be used
interchangeably.
29. See id. at 213.
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of the potential for differing results inherent in a discretionary
system of decision, states forseeably could reach different
conclusions when faced with an identical foreign decree.
Although opponents believe that a truly uniform rule may be of
slight necessity and may offer little improvement in the
estimation of other nations, 30 there is a significant amount of
support for a federal standard of enforcement. This support
stems from desires to keep up with and promote further global
business and trade, to establish a predictable, even-handed
international jurisdiction regime, and to minimize worldwide
forum shopping.31
B. FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS
The abundance of international communication present in
our globalized society, particularly with the advent and
proliferation of the Internet, increases the likelihood that
seeking to enforce a foreign judgment in this country may
implicate the guarantees of free speech and expression
embodied in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 32
Two cases, both involving the enforcement of British decisions
in libel suits, demonstrate this problem. In both state and
federal jurisdictions, courts interpreted the British holdings as
contrary to public policy because they did not meet the legal
standards required by the Supreme Court in a defamation
action. 33 Though both U.S. and United Kingdom libel laws
derive from the same common law source,34 the First
30. See Friedrich K Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J.
INTL L. 111, 113 (1998).
31. See Edward C. Y. Lau, Update on the Hague Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 5 (2000)
("There is a great need for this treaty due to the growth of global business and
trade."); Harold G. Maier, A Hague Conference Judgments Convention and United
States Courts: A Problem and a Possibility, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1207 (1998) (stating a
multilateral convention creating uniform rules is "long overdue"); Andrew L.
Strauss, Where America Ends and the International Order Begins: Interpreting the
Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a Proposed Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1237,
1239 (1998) (explaining that advantages of a treaty regime would include the
reduction in potential forum shopping and the cessation of discriminatory treatment
of American citizens in the jurisdictional reach of European courts).
32. See Traynor, supra note 25, at 8.
33. See Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.C. 1995); Bachchan v.
India Abroad Publ., Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d. 661, 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992); discussion infra
part I.B.2.
34. See Derek Devgun, United States Enforcement of English Defamation
Judgments: Exporting the First Amendment?, 23 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 195, 196 (1994).
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Amendment of the U.S. Constitution creates additional
protection for defendants in U.S. defamation cases. As a result,
the courts declined to enforce the foreign courts' judgments. 35
These cases demonstrate the differences between American and
British defamation law and the concomitant concerns that arise
when foreign laws that allow penalties for speech that would be
constitutionally protected in the United States are presented for
enforcement in American courts.
1. Defamation Causes of Action in the United States
In the United States, state law governs a defamation cause
of action. Though the precise legal standard of defamation
claims may differ between jurisdictions, most states base the
cause of action on the English common law tort.36 Generally, a
plaintiff must prove the defendant made an unprivileged, false
statement negatively reflecting upon and concerning the
plaintiff to a third party.37 Truth is an absolute defense for the
defendant.38 In certain cases, recovery for this action is limited
by the guarantee of free speech found in the First Amendment.39
In the landmark 1964 decision, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a public official suing for
defamation must establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant made the defamatory statement knowing of
its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth.40 The Court
later extended this standard to public figures, so as to include
those individuals who have all-around notoriety and influence or
who have voluntarily put themselves at the forefront of a public
controversy in order to influence its outcome. 41 In Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., the Court held that a private plaintiff in a
35. See Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 6; Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d. at 665.
36. See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d. at 665.
37. See, e.g., Smith v. Maldonado, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 402 (Cal. App. 1999);
Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 698 N.E.2d 674, 678 (111. App. 1998); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a)-(b) (1976).
38. See, e.g., Pollnow v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 501 N.Y.S.2d 17,18
(App. Div. 1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1976).
39. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
40. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). This
standard required the plaintiff to show "actual malice" on the part of the defendant.
Id. at 280. Applying this test the Court held that the New York Times was not liable
for an advertisement printed in the Times that was purchased by a civil rights group
and contained factual mistakes. See id. at 258-59, 286.
41. See Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967) (holding that a
University of Georgia athletic director and former football coach was a public figure).
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defamation suit involving a matter of public concern must
similarly face a higher standard of proof than in a traditional
defamation action.42 Further, state laws allowing presumed or
punitive damages in suits involving private citizens regarding
matters of public concern, were held unconstitutional if they did
not require the plaintiff to prove knowing falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth to recover these awards. 43
The Court began establishing these additional burdens in
the context of defamation to safeguard society's interest in open
and robust communication." Protection of the criticism of public
officials and matters, and free expression and debate is
generally seen as central to the purpose of the First
Amendment.45  Such political speech is considered core
expression because it facilitates self-government and
maintenance of a democratic society.46 The Court has thus been
very cautious in allowing liability for speech about the
government or important social affairs so as to avoid deterring
controversial speech protected under the U.S. Constitution.47
Unlike the United States' system, English libel law is not
limited by the requirements of a constitutional provision
ensuring free speech.48
2. British Libel Judgments
English common law principles provide the major substance
42. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (holding an
attorney was a private figure but his involvement in a highly publicized trial was a
matter of public concern). The Court held, "so long as they do not impose liability
without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability..." Id. at 347. In suits by private persons involving matters of private
concern, a state may allow recovery of punitive damages without any showing of
fault by the defendant. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 762-63 (1985) (giving an erroneous credit report to a bank was not a public
matter).
43. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
44. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
45. See id. at 273-75.
46. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 24-28 (1960); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 204-10.
47. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279 (stating that "[W]ould-be critics of
official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism even though it is in fact
true.. .," and that such a chilling effect on speech "dampens the vigor and limits the
variety of public debate."); See generally Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 (permitting excessive
liability "unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship.").
48. See Devgun, supra note 34, at 197.
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of the United Kingdom's defamation law.49 A plaintiff can
establish the elements of a defamation case by showing the
defendant communicated, to a third party, a statement that
refers directly or indirectly to the plaintiff and that tends to
lower the plaintiffs reputation or expresses "hatred, contempt,
or ridicule."50 If these elements are established, the statement is
presumed false and the plaintiff can recover without showing
any bad faith or fault on the part of the defendant.51 If the
statement was a libel, meaning it was in writing or other
permanent form, injury is presumed.52 The defendant can defeat
a claim by establishing that the statement was substantially
true or making out the affirmative defense of "fair comment,"
which applies to expressions of opinion about issues of public
concern. 53 Other defenses include qualified and absolute
privilege and innocent dissemination. 54
Two cases decided under this body of law were brought to
the United States when plaintiffs of two British libel actions
attempted to enforce their judgments against defendants
residing in the United States. In the first case, Bachchan v.
India Abroad Publications, Inc., the plaintiff sought to enforce a
money judgment from the High Court of Justice in London
rendered against a New York-based operator of an Indian news
service in New York court.55 The defendant, India Abroad
Publications, Inc., published a story in the United Kingdom
49. See Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, An Opportunity Lost: The
United Kingdom's Failed Reform of Defamation Law, 49 FED. COMM. L. J. 621, 621
(1997).
50. Id. at 624-25.
51. See id. at 625.
52. See id.
53. See id. In assessing whether a defendant's statements are "fair comment,"
the words are read alone, out of the context of the overall speech, and thus are less
likely to meet this defense than if the statement was evaluated in context. See
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 235 (Md. 1997). Proof of ill will or intent to
injure defeats a "fair comment" defense. See id. at 234, n.4.
54. See Vick & MacPherson, supra note 49, at 625-26. The Defamation Act of
1996 made some changes to this area of law in three general respects. See id. at 629.
These alterations, which modify defenses for application to the internet and
international communications and procedural reforms, and allowing for waiver of
Parliamentary privilege, are not drastic and do not affect the subject within the
scope of this note. See id. In fact, some British commentary has criticized the statute
as posing even greater dangers of inhibiting free press by continuing to and possibly
even increasingly favoring the plaintiffs. See Alex Wade, The Defamation Act of
1996: Potential Impact and Relationship With the Present Law Of Libel, 1 TOLLEY'S
COMM. L. 186, 186 (1996).
55. See Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ., Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d. 661, 661 (Sup. Ct.
1992).
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claiming that the plaintiff, an Indian national and former
member of Parliament, had been involved in a scandal between
Sweden and India regarding a munitions contract.56 The court
found that the subject of the defendant's publication, "an
international scandal," was a matter of public concern.57 As
such, constitutional law would require that the plaintiff bear the
burden of showing falsity if the suit was brought in a U.S.
court.5 8 Under English law, however, the falsity of the
statements was presumed and the burden of proving truth
placed on the defendant. 59
Because the English law did not protect the defendant to
the extent the First Amendment would have, the court held that
the judgment was unenforceable as repugnant to public policy
under the New York foreign judgments statute.60 Having
adopted the standards found in the Foreign Money-Judgments
Act,61  the New York Civil Practice Rules allowed for
discretionary non-recognition in cases presenting conflicts with
public policy. 62 The judge ruled that allowing recovery under a
defamation standard that did not meet the requirements of
American jurisprudence would contravene the policy and
protections of free speech and debate found in the Federal and
New York Constitutions. 63 The potential for creating a "chilling
effect" on free press publication and expression was held to be
too great to enforce the British ruling.6
Faced with a somewhat similar case, the court in
Matusevitch v. Telnikoff again refused to recognize a judgment
based on English libel law.65 Both Matusevitch and Telnikoff
grew up in Russia. 66 After Matusevitch defected and Telnikoff
56. See id.
57. Id. at 664.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 663.
60. See id. at 665.
61. See supra part I.A.2 (discussing the Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments
Recognition Act).
62. See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
63. See id. at 662, 665. The opinion also states that under New York
defamation law the plaintiff may only recover by establishing the publisher acted in
"'a grossly irresponsible manner'" if the statement at issue is of legitimate public
concern and the suit is against a media defendant. Id. at 665. In contrast, the
English rule required no showing of fault or disregard for standard journalistic
practice. See id. at 663.
64. See id. at 664.
65. See Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.C. 1995).
66. See Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 232 (Md. 1997). This is the
opinion given by a Maryland court after the United States Court of Appeals for the
2001]
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emigrated both spent time working as journalists for a publicly
funded radio station broadcasting to Eastern Europe and former
Soviet territory.67 Telnikoff, the plaintiff in the English libel
suit, had previously worked for the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC).68 In 1984, he wrote a letter that was
published in the London newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, which
criticized the BBC's service to Russia. 69  In response,
Matusevitch, the original defendant, wrote a letter also
published in the Telegraph that indicated his belief that
Telnikoffs letter was anti-Semitic.70 After writing a rebuttal
letter, Telnikoff sued and obtained a judgment for libel based on
the remarks in Matusevitch's letter.71
The court found that the Telnikoff was a public figure for
purposes of the case, as he was a prominent human rights
activist in the former Soviet Union, and the speech at issue was
made in this context.72 Thus, Matusevitch was entitled, under
the First Amendment, to the safeguards established by the
heightened standards of U.S. law when defending a defamation
action brought by a public figure.7 3
The opinion acknowledged the tradition and utility of
comity principles in international adjudication matters, but
found that to award Telnikoff's judgment full faith and credit in
a U.S. court "would deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional
rights."74 As in the Bachchan case, the court focused on the
substantive differences between American and English
defamation laws, concluding that the lack of an "actual malice"
standard 75 and of a fault requirement in U.K. law rendered the
judgment "repugnant to the public policies of the State of
Maryland and the United States."76
Because the British law failed to take into account the libel
District of Columbia Circuit certified a question of Maryland law to the state court
when Telnikoff appealed the ruling of the D.C. District Court. See id. at 236. The
D.C. Circuit's opinion does not give a lot of information about the parties and facts of
the case, thus cites to both are used.
67. See id. at 232.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 233, 235.
71. See id. at 233-34.
72. See Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 5.
73. See id. at 5-6.
74. Id.
75. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
(describing "actual malice").
76. Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 4.
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plaintiffs status, the defendant's state of mind, or the context of
the allegedly defamatory speech, the court believed the
judgment offended public policy embodied in our notions of free
speech and press.77 The opinion asserts that when the
statements at issue are read in context, they appear to be mere
hyperbole or opinions and therefore not actionable under U.S.
law.78 The court relied on the public policy exception to the
Foreign Money-Judgments Act, 79 adopted by Maryland to
govern foreign enforcement proceedings, to exercise its
discretion to decline enforcement of the judgment.80  The
rationale on which these cases are based is that allowing
recognition of awards resulting from restrictions on speech is
incompatible with the protection of freedom of expression as set
out in the First Amendment of the Constitution.81
C. THE PROPOSED HAGUE JUDGMENTS CONVENTION
In 1992, the United States Department of State proposed a
project on international jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments to the Secretary General of the Hague Conference.8 2
In 1996, the Conference agreed to include a Convention on its
forthcoming agenda,83 and on October 30, 1999, the special
commission adopted the revised preliminary draft. This text is
currently awaiting approval by a Diplomatic Conference,
scheduled for 2001.84
The proposed Hague Judgments Convention covers two
fundamental principles of civil and commercial law-judgment
recognition and enforcement, and jurisdiction.8 5 Chapter II of
the Convention contains a three-step approach that prescribes
mandatory bases of jurisdiction, 86 grounds to which domestic
77. See id. at 4-6.
78. See id. at 4-5.
79. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
80. See Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 3.
81. See id.
82. See Pfund, supra note 2, at 8. The Hague Conference is made up of forty-
seven nation states, including Canada and Mexico, the European Union member
states, China, Japan, and Israel, and several Latin American countries. See id. at
11.
83. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Final Act of the
Eighteenth Session, Oct. 19, 1996, pt. B(1), 35 I.L.M. 1391, 1405.
84. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
85. See Hague Convention, supra note 7, chs. II-III.
86. See id. arts. 3-16. "A defendant may be sued in the courts of the State
where that defendant is habitually resident." Id. art. 3, para. 1. "If the parties have
agreed that a court or courts of a Contracting State shall have jurisdiction to settle
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rules may be applied,87 and prohibited grounds of jurisdiction,
which may not be asserted by the member states.88 These have
been deemed "Required Bases," "Permitted Bases" and
"Prohibited Bases" of jurisdiction.8 9
Chapter III deals with recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments.90 It establishes that a final judgment of one
Member State must be recognized in the courts of any other
contracting party, provided that the issuing court had valid
jurisdiction.91 The enforcing state cannot review the merits of
the claim on which the judgment is based. 92 Discretionary
grounds for refusal, set out in Article 28, limit this general rule
of recognition. 93 The residual public policy exception is of
particular interest and significance in the context of judgments
involving liability resulting from a party's speech or
expression.94 It provides for the denial or refusal of a judgment
when "recognition or enforcement would be manifestly
incompatible with the public policy of the State addressed."95
any dispute.. .that jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed
otherwise." Id. art. 4, para. 1. Article five deals with waiver of jurisdiction by
appearance, stating that "[a] court has jurisdiction if the defendant proceeds on the
merits without contesting jurisdiction." Id. art. 5. Articles six and seven cover
contract actions, such that, "[a] plaintiff may bring an action in contract in the
courts of a State in which-in matters relating to the supply of goods, the goods were
supplied in whole or in part...", and articles 8-16 cover other specific subjects, such
as employment contracts (article 8), torts (article 10), and trusts (article 11). See id.
arts. 6-16.
87. See id. art. 17 ("Subject to Articles 4, 5, 7, 8, 12 and 13, the Convention does
not prevent the application by Contracting States of rules of jurisdiction under
national law, provided that this is not prohibited under Article 18").
88. See id. art. 18. 'Where the defendant is habitually resident in a Contracting
State, the application of a rule of jurisdiction provided for under national law of a
Contracting State is prohibited if there is no substantial connection between that
State and the dispute." Id. para. 1. Paragraph two lists particular grounds on which
jurisdiction may not be asserted without further basis (such as the presence of
property owned by the defendant, the nationality of either of the parties, or service
of writ on the defendant). See id. para. 2.
89. Lau, supra note 5, at 15.
90. See Hague Judgments Convention, supra note 7, ch. III.
91. See id. art. 25.
92. See id. art. 28, para. 2.
93. See id. art. 28. A judgment may be refused if: (a) a suit involving the same
subject matter is pending before a court first seised; (b) the judgment is inconsistent
with a prior, enforceable judgment; (c) the issuing court was partial or violated
fundamental principles of procedure; (d) the defendant did not have sufficient time
to prepare a defense; (e) the ruling was procured by fraud; or (f) recognition would be
incompatible with the public policy of the enforcing state. See id.
94. See id. art. 28, para. 1(f).
95. Id.
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This language mirrors the discretionary rule found in the
Foreign Money Judgments Act that allows courts to refuse to
enforce a judgment "repugnant to the public policy of the
state."96 As explained above, two U.S. courts utilized this
language to deny enforcement of libel judgments rendered
abroad. 97
The impetus behind the U.S. support of the Hague
Convention is primarily the lack of enforcement given to U.S.
judgments abroad relative to the United States' generosity in
recognition of other nations' judgments. 98 American attorneys
with clients involved in international commerce frequently
inquire with the State Department regarding enforcement
concerns when U.S. businesses and citizens have obtained
judgments abroad or are considering legal action.99
Concern with European nations possibly subjecting
American parties to discriminatory assertions of jurisdiction
also motivated supporters of the Convention. 100 European
international jurisdiction and enforcement issues are covered by
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, which generally require
recognition of judgments of other contracting parties. 101
Judgments of member states are enforced in other European
jurisdictions routinely with a great deal of success. 0 2 The
Brussels Convention, from which the Lugano Convention is
derived, has been deemed "the single most important private
international law treaty in history."0 3 Though these states are
96. Foreign Money-Judgments Act, supra note 20, § 4(b)(3). See supra part
I.A.2 for an explanation of the Uniform Act.
97. See supra part I.B.2 (discussing the Matusevitch and Bachchan cases).
98. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85
CORNELL L. REV., 89, 89 (1999); Lau, supra note 5, at 14; Pfund, supra note 2, at 9.
99. See Pfund, supra note 2, at 8.
100. See id. at 9; Juenger, supra note 30, at 115.
101. See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 8
I.L.M. 229 (1969), as amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted as amended in 29
I.L.M. 1413 (1990) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]; Lugano Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments on Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept.
16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) [hereinafter Lugano
Convention].
Exceptions to the rule of mandatory recognition exist for conflict with public
policy or prior final judgments, certain jurisdiction inconsistencies, default
judgments without proper service and opportunity to present a defense, and
judgments regarding status, capacity, or succession. See Brussels Convention, supra
art. 27; Lugano Convention, supra art. 27.
102. See Juenger, supra note 30, at 116.
103. Id.
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bound by this uniform and well-functioning jurisdiction treaty
regime with respect to other European countries, they are free
to use broad domestic jurisdiction laws for non-member parties,
such as the United States. 10 4 The use of these laws is
problematic for U.S. businesses and interests because American
defendants could be haled into court in very inconvenient
forums. Consequently, the U.S. delegates desire to enter into an
agreement with the Brussels and Lugano nations. 10 5 However,
as U.S. representatives work with these potential contracting
parties to create a final Hague Judgments Convention, they
must ensure that the United States' responsibilities under this
international treaty will comply with the demands of the
Constitution. 106
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMANDS: FIRST AMENDMENT
SCRUTINY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The limits placed by the First Amendment on the role of
American courts in international litigation are specific to the
United States, as imposed by the constitutional guarantees of
our judicial framework. The supremacy of the Constitution in
our legal order demands the attention and adherence of law and
policy makers in all domestic contexts, 01 yet with the growth of
the global marketplace for goods and ideas, the United States is
confronted with legal issues of international implication. As
trade across national borders continues to flourish and expand,
questions of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments
involving foreign courts, nations, and parties are coming to the
forefront of the private international law community. 0 8 The
internal constitutional implications of this phenomenon must be
considered in the formulation of multinational policies and
rules.
104. See Brussels Convention, supra note 101, at tit. III. "A judgment given in a
Contracting State shall be recognized in the other Contracting States. . ." (emphasis
added). Id. sec. 1, art. 26.
105. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
106. See De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 5-6 (1957) ("The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution... It can
only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution... ").
107. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (the constitution is the supreme law of the land);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (legislation contrary to the dictates of
the constitution is void); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute").
108. See Neff, supra note 4, at X.
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A. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
As the Bachchan and Matusevitch cases demonstrate, U.S.
courts have thus far been unwilling to enforce libel judgments
based on laws not meeting First Amendment standards. The
New York and Maryland'0 9 courts found the defamation
judgments contradictory to state and national public policy and
therefore subject to discretionary rejection." 0 Because the courts
rejected recognition of these judgments through application of
their state enforcement laws, they did not use the traditional
Supreme Court analysis for issues of suppression of speech.
In determining the validity of laws infringing on expression,
the Court has developed different degrees of review depending
on the type of law at issue and its affect on freedom of
expression."' In traditional First Amendment analysis, laws
aimed at the content of speech receive strict scrutiny, that is,
they must serve a compelling government interest and be
narrowly tailored to that end. 112 Laws that are content-neutral
and regulate the time, place and manner of speech, or are not
aimed at expression but have an incidental burden on
expression are subject to intermediate scrutiny, generally
requiring a substantial or significant government interest and a
close fit between that end and the means employed. 13 This
intermediate level of review is also applied to symbolic speech,
109. The Matusevitch case was heard by the District Court, District of Columbia,
which certified the question of whether enforcement of the libel judgment would be
repugnant to Maryland public policy to the Maryland Court of Appeals.
110. See discussion, supra part I.B.2 (describing the facts and rulings of the
Bachchan and Matusevitch cases).
111. This analysis applies to state or federal actions abridging First Amendment
rights. The First Amendment reads "Congress shall make no law.. .abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. This proscription was
made applicable to the states through enactment of the 14th amendment and cases
incorporating the speech clause into the amendment's due process provision. See id.
amend. XIV; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654 (1925) (criminal anarchy
conviction under New York statute upheld against First Amendment challenge);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (conviction of member of Communist
Labor Party upheld over challenge that California Criminal Syndicalism Act was
unconstitutional). There must be some state action to assert a constitutional
challenge. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (holding that the
constitution protects against all forms of government action including judicial
enforcement of laws).
112. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 120 (1991).
113. See Heffron v. Int'l. Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649, 654
(1981); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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or action that is intended and understood to be expressive. 114
Under the test articulated in United States v. O'Brien, the
classic application of intermediate scrutiny, a law will be upheld
despite its burden on expression if it furthers a substantial or
important government interest that is unrelated to suppressing
speech, and the incidental restriction on expression is no greater
than necessary to further this goal. 115 Laws of general
applicability or those that are not aimed at and do not involve
significant expression receive no First Amendment scrutiny. 1 6
As an example of such a case, in Cohen v. Cowles Media, Co., 117
the Supreme Court upheld an award of damages in a promissory
estoppel cause of action against a newspaper, an entity
protected explicitly by the First Amendment.1 8 Cohen, the
plaintiff, campaigned for a Republican gubernatorial candidate
and, days before the election, revealed information to the
defendant newspapers about the criminal record of the
Democratic Lieutenant Governor candidate. 19 Reporters for the
papers promised confidentiality but made editorial decisions to
publish Cohen's name as an important part of the story. 20 The
newspaper asserted that because the suit was based on a
published story and a reporter's judgment that revelation of a
source's name was newsworthy in and of itself, allowing the
plaintiff to keep his recovery would inhibit journalistic
discretion and candid reporting.' 2' The Court rejected this
argument, holding that newspapers could not be immunized
from laws of general applicability. 22
114. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (defendant's display of
an American flag with a peace sign affixed held to be symbolic speech); Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (O'Brien test applied to nude dancing, a
form of expressive conduct).
115. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (1968). In this decision, the court upheld a
federal military law against destruction of draft cards, even as applied to an
individual who burned his draft card as a form of protest, and therefore argued that
it was expressive conduct. See id.
116. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (promissory
estoppel action allowed against the defendant newspaper); Arcara v. Cloud Books,
Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986) (the Court allowed New York to shut down an adult
bookstore for violation of the public health code).
117. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
118. See id. at 670. The press is an institution uniquely singled out for
protection under the First Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ... or of the
press").
119. See 501 U.S. at 665.
120. See id. at 665-66.
121. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
122. See id. at 670.
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The values protected 123 by this scrutiny regime may collide
with the interests of international relations when speech-related
judgments obtained abroad are presented for enforcement in the
United States. Courts will have to consider both the potential
threat to freedom of speech and the concerns of foreign relations
and international cooperation when evaluating a judgment for
recognition. This is particularly true in light of the place of
treaties and international affairs in the structure of our
government.
B. TREATY SUPREMACY
If the Hague Judgments Convention is adopted, it would
raise the issue of enforcement of foreign judgments from a state
law matter to a nationally uniform standard controlled by a
federal treaty. The 1920 Supreme Court decision in Missouri v.
Holland 24 established that a treaty made pursuant to the U.S.
Constitution is superior to state law, even in areas generally
reserved for state regulation. 25 Thus the states, which now
apply their individual laws to questions of enforcement of
foreign judgments, would be required to apply the provisions of
the Hague treaty governing enforcement. 26 This distinction is of
hierarchical importance even though the relevant terms of the
Convention are quite similar to those currently used in state
laws on foreign enforcement, 27 because it implicates the broader
powers of the federal government legislating in the
international realm.
Article II of the Constitution gives the president the power
to make treaties, provided that two-thirds of the Senate
123. See, Emerson, supra note 6, at 878 (examining the four primary categorical
rationales for protecting freedom of speech: self-fulfillment, the search for truth,
facilitation of the democratic political process, and social control to balance stability
and change).
124. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding a migratory bird treaty
between the United States and Canada trumped a conflicting state law).
125. See id. at 435.
126. See Hague Convention, supra note 7, ch. III. The treaty is not self-
executing, and members of the American Law Institute are currently working on
drafting implementing legislation for a federal statute that would import the rules of
the Convention to U.S. domestic law. See Silberman & Lowenfeld, infra note 134, at
635. In order to simplify this area of discussion, for the purposes of this note the
Hague Judgments Convention will be referred to as directly applicable to federal
and state courts.
127. See supra part I.A.2 (discussing current state law practices for enforcing
foreign nation judgments).
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concurs. 128 The Supreme Court has thus given the president a
great deal of latitude in foreign affairs, according him, "within
the international field[,] ... a degree of discretion and freedom
from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved."129 A treaty is still subordinate
to the Constitution, and its rules must conform to this inferior
position,130 but Supreme Court case law establishes that when
an international interest is at stake, claims of
unconstitutionality will not be easily recognized. 131
III. THE HAGUE CONVENTION, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
AND FUTURE DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
A. FROM STATE LAW TO INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: THE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TREATY POWERS ADD A NEW DIMENSION
TO ENFORCEMENT.
Should the United States adopt the Hague Judgments
Convention, the foreign relations and global trade issues
implicated in a multilateral international treaty may cause the
number of discretionary denials of foreign judgment recognition
to decline. The courts may become wary of exercising discretion
to refuse enforcement pursuant to a public policy exception such
as that found in the Hague Judgments Convention draft. 132 The
political realities of having to please other Parties in order to
assure the Convention's effectiveness and the give-and-take
inherent in negotiation of a large-scale treaty regime, 133 may
push the U.S. government to call for enforcement in all but the
128. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
129. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
130. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Missouri, 252 U.S. at 434 (treaty held superior to state law in
arguable violation of the 10' Amendment); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 234
(Presidential agreement with the former Soviet Union controlled disposition of
Russian Insurance funds held by the New York Superintendent of Insurance
pursuant to New York law); Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 320 (the
president's historical role as the organ of the nation in foreign affairs provides him
greater discretion and freedom to act than in domestic affairs); Edwards v. Carter,
580 F.2d 1055, 1056 (1978) (suit by members of Congress challenging president's use
of treaty power to transfer the Panama Canal to Panama as unconstitutional
dismissed for failure to state a claim).
132. See supra text accompanying note 93 for the public policy exception.
133. See Pfund, supra note 2, at 15.
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most egregious circumstances. 134
As mentioned above, the foreign affairs interests involved
do not change the fact that state courts applying the Hague
Judgments Convention will still have the discretionary public
policy exemption available. The Convention does, however, add
a federal government claim to demand judgment enforcement as
it directs according to the terms of the treaty (i.e., recognition of
judgments in all but the most extreme circumstances). While
the national government wants inclusion of a public policy
exception to protect itself from being bound to honor very
unsavory foreign rulings, it must also contend with the concern
of other nations that the exception "might be a potential
'loophole' for abuse."135 Thus, during the final negotiation
process the United States may be encouraged to require its
courts to interpret this provision very narrowly. 136 Such a
position is also indicated in the language of the Convention, as a
judgment must be "manifestly incompatible," not merely
contrary to the public policy of the addressed state.' 37
B. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION OR FREE SPEECH: BETWEEN A
ROCK AND A HARD PLACE?
While post-Hague Convention courts may not automatically
decline enforcement of, for example, libel or hate speech 38
134. See generally Linda J. Silberman & Andreas Lowenfeld, A Different Project
for the ALL: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty and an
American Statute, 75 IND. L. J. 635 (2000) (arguing that the Hague Convention
should facilitate a "correct understanding of a meaningful public policy defense" in
order to differentiate between cases with which U.S. courts may not agree and those
that truly threaten U.S. interests.)
135. Lau, supra note 5, at 23.
136. This may be especially true with respect to the United Kingdom, as the
U.S. attempted to negotiate a bilateral enforcement treaty with Britain in the 1970s,
but was unsuccessful due to opposition from the U.K. See Pfund, supra note 2, at 8.
137. See Hague Judgments Convention, supra note 7, art. 28, para. 1(f); supra
text accompanying note 93 ("Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be
refused if... recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the
public policy of the state addressed").
138. See, e.g., Sionadh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A
Comparison of the American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS
J. 305, 319 (1999) (explaining that Germany has stringent criminal laws against
hate speech and activities aimed at encouraging racial hatred). While many Western
nations have such statutes prohibiting "hate speech," American courts may not
sanction such expression because it amounts to "viewpoint" discrimination
intolerable under the First Amendment. See R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
387 (1992). See generally Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d. 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding
Nazi group's right to demonstrate in a predominately Jewish neighborhood).
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judgments that could not be obtained in the United States,
diplomacy concerns should not require courts to altogether
disregard consideration of First Amendment concerns. There is
an argument to be made, however, that because the grounds for
refusal of recognition are discretionary, a court is under no
obligation to even consider the constitutional implications of
enforcing a given judgment. The free speech clause only
prohibits the U.S. government from prohibiting expression. 139
Neither Congress nor a state government would have created a
law abridging free speech when a U.S. court enforces a foreign
libel judgment, even if the holding would not be constitutional
under U.S. law. The fact is the substantive rule behind the
judgment would come from another country. With the added
implications of a treaty, courts may prefer to defer to the foreign
affairs power of the executive branch 140 and routinely enforce
judgments to further the goals of treaty. 14 1 In fact, under current
judgment enforcement rules, 142 a number of American courts
have rejected the public policy exemption and enforced foreign
judgments where the cause of action on which the judgment was
based had been abolished or did not exist in the addressed
forum. 143 Yet, the Constitution is the ultimate body of
controlling law in the United States, and its guarantees are not
truly comparable to state statutes or common law.'" There is,
however, no prohibition in its provisions against creating a
treaty that requires enforcement of a ruling of a court not
subject to the mandates of the U.S. Constitution.
Following this reasoning, courts could quite conceivably
choose to subordinate speech policy concerns to foreign affairs.
It might thus be argued that U.S. tribunals could enforce
judgments without regard to the First Amendment, even though
enforcing such judgments could have serious detrimental affects
on free speech. 145 However, under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of what constitutes action attributable to the
government,146 and thus subject to the constraints of the
Constitution, such treatment of judgments should not be
139. Thus, a U.S. law or even a treaty directly infringing free speech could not
be allowed. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 129, 131 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
142. See discussion, supra part I.A.2.
143. See supra note 23.
144. See supra notes 107, 131 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 182-184 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 111, infra notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
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permissible.
Invoking the Constitution as a source of law requires
showing the complained of action is attributable to the state. 147
In 1948, the Supreme Court held that judicial enforcement of a
private real estate covenant that prohibited a black family from
purchasing a home would constitute government sanction of the
racial terms of the deed and therefore be unconstitutional. 14
The Court declared that the Constitution applies to "exertions of
state power in all forms" such that the simple act of enforcing a
rule through judicial process, though the rule itself is not
subject to the constraints and requirements of the Constitution,
is enough to implicate state action and require the rule to
conform to Constitutional standards. 49 Though in this case the
covenant at issue was an agreement between private citizens
and not a European law regulating speech, the analogy of a rule
outside the scope and jurisdiction of the U.S. Constitution
applies. Neither the actions of private parties, nor the laws of
other nations can be directly regulated by the Constitution. 150
Yet, an attempt to enforce private covenants and foreign
judgments subjects them to the government of the United States
by bringing them before the judicial branch.' 5' Thus, the
Supreme Court would likely hold that enforcement of foreign
libel judgments requires First Amendment analysis by the
addressed court. The issue then becomes a determination of the
level of scrutiny that will apply. 5 2
C. POTENTIAL CHOICES AND A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
One way to ensure protection of free speech values may be
to avoid determining how closely the courts should scrutinize a
judgment enforcement that indirectly implicated free speech
concerns, and simply apply our own defamation laws to each
147. See supra note 111 (citing the Supreme Court's holding in Shelley v.
Kramer that judicial enforcement of private agreements creates state action).
148. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14. Because the Constitution is only
applicable to government action, a private actor may generally racially discriminate
or abridge free speech where the Fourteenth and First Amendments would forbid
similar state action.
149. Id. at 20.
150. As noted, the Constitution restricts and prescribes government action
against citizens. See supra notes 111, 148-149. There are exceptions to this rule,
such as the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against slavery, which does directly
restrict private action. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
151. See supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
152. See supra part II.A (explaining levels of First Amendment scrutiny).
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case and see if they pass constitutional muster.153 No matter
how strongly ethnocentrism or the desire to "export[] the First
Amendment"154 may encourage this type of approach, courts are
prohibited from reexamining the merits of a valid, final foreign
judgment, and may only inquire into the facts enough to
establish whether there exists manifest incompatibility with
public policy.155 Such treatment would also render the treaty
pointless, as a requirement of enforcement necessarily means
giving up the right to substitute one's own laws for that of a
foreign state. Yet, if the First Amendment is going to be
considered, as this Note argues it must, there needs to be some
standards for determining whether a particular case contradicts
free speech policy enough to be denied recognition.
Whatever the possible effects of enforcing a British libel
judgment in this country the Hague Judgment Convention, is
not aimed at regulating the content 156 of free expression, or any
speech at all. An analysis of whether enforcing a foreign
judgment is precluded by the policies protected in the
guarantees of the First Amendment would therefore fall under
one of the Court's precedents involving laws of general
applicability or incidental burdens on freedom of speech.15 7
When speech is burdened not directly by a law aimed at
regulation of expression, but incidentally as a result of
application of a facially neutral rule the general standard of
review is intermediate scrutiny.158 The O'Brien test 159 dictates
that a law that incidentally burdens expression will be upheld if
it furthers a substantial government interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieving this end. 160 Enforcement in the United
States of a libel judgment rendered under standards not
conforming to the First Amendment would likely burden free
speech in certain circumstances.'16 A law, such as the Hague
153. See supra part I.B.1 (describing defamation standards in U.S. law).
154. Devgun, supra note 34, at 195.
155. See supra notes 91, 95 and accompanying text.
156. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 105, 120.
157. See Heffron, 452 U.S. 649, 654; O'Brien, 391 U.S. 377; Spence, 418 U.S. 409;
Barnes, 501 U.S. 566; Cohen, 501 U.S. 670; Arcara, 478 U.S. 707.
158. See Heffron, 452 U.S. 649, 654; O'Brien, 391 U.S. 377; Spence, 418 U.S. 409;
Barnes, 501 U.S. 566; Cohen, 501 U.S. 670.
159. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. 377.
160. See Id.
161. Enforcing these judgments when doing so would punish and potentially
chill expression occurring within the United States and dealing with matters of
public concern would affect free speech. See infra notes 181-185, 187 and
accompanying text.
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Judgments Convention, allowing for recovery under such
relatively lax foreign standards, 162 could thus infringe on the
guarantees of freedom of speech, though aimed only at
regulating international civil and commercial litigation. The
Hague Judgments Convention would then appear to be subject
to the O'Brien test, as it would further government interests in
foreign relations and certainty in global trade dispute
resolution. Moreover, its impact on speech would be indirect.
The use of this test would provide a good degree of protection for
the policies embedded in the First Amendment when analyzing
whether to decline recognition of a judgment, because the
restriction imposed on the particular speech would be
considered and the government would have to show that its
international relations interests were directly advanced by
mandatory enforcement. 6 3 This standard, however, takes no
account of whether the parties and interests involved are truly
proper subjects for application of U.S. constitutional scrutiny.16
Further, the Court has focused the O'Brien analysis on
situations in which conduct "with a significant expressive
element" is at issue.165 It is most applicable to cases in which a
law impacts physical activity, versus actual speech, that is
considered to fall under the ambit of the First Amendment by
virtue of its expressive nature. 66 As a result, the O'Brien test
may not provide useful guidance for a judge attempting to
determine whether enforcement of a specific judgment would be
so incompatible with freedom of expression that it warranted
non-recognition despite the factors mitigating toward
enforcement. 67
In another line of cases addressing "incidental" restrictions
on speech, the Court declined to apply any First Amendment
consideration. 68 In Cohen v. Cowles Media, the Court upheld
the liability of the defendant newspaper in a promissory
162. See supra part I.B.2 (explaining elements of British libel law not acceptable
under the Constitution).
163. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
164. See infra notes 177-179 and accompanying text (suggesting factors a court
should consider in determining whether to apply the public policy exemption in the
name of the First Amendment).
165. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986).
166. See Spence, 418 U.S. 409; Barnes, 501 U.S. 566.
167. See supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text (foreign affairs and
predictability in trade matters call for limited use of discretion to decline
enforcement).
168. See Conen, 501 U.S. at 670; Arcara, 478 U.S. 707;
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estoppel suit.169 Though the press argued that allowing the
ruling to stand would inhibit its constitutionally protected right
and duty to facilitate speech and ideas, the Court refused to
exempt the press from liability, declaring that "generally
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement.., has incidental effects [on
speech.]"170 Here again the parallel exists between two laws
unrelated to the suppression of speech. The enforcement
provisions of the Hague Judgments Convention are rules of
general applicability, as they are to apply to any type of final
judgment founded on valid jurisdiction. 7' Cohen could then be
said to apply by analogy, as enforcing a European restriction on
speech could place a burden on a U.S. speaker or publisher
similar to that imposed by the common law judgment upheld
against the press in that case. Neither the promissory estoppel
law nor the Hague Judgments Convention single out speech as
their targets, nor even mention expression in their texts. But
applying this type of analysis would afford the speech at issue in
foreign libel or hate speech cases 72 no protection whatsoever.173
While this may further the government interest in minimizing
use of the public policy exception to mandatory enforcement, 74
it does not give due attention to the free speech issues at stake.
IV. RECONSILING THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE HAGUE JUDGMENTS CONVENTION
Once it is established that a court should consider the First
Amendment when faced with the decision of whether to honor a
foreign judgment pursuant to the Hague Convention, 175 there
will be difficulty in analyzing the competing interests between
global responsibility and facilitation of commerce and protecting
freedom of speech under current U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence. None of the First Amendment cases to date
consider the issue of recognizing in this country a judgment of a
169. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 663, 669-70; supra notes 116-122 and accompanying
text.
170. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
171. See Hague Judgment Convention, supra note 7, ch. III.
172. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
173. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
174. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text (state action that occurs
when there is judicial enforcement of an agreement or judgment requires courts to
refrain from enforcing judgments that infringe the First Amendment).
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foreign jurisdiction not bound by the U.S. Constitution. Further,
the two recent British libel judgments presented for
enforcement were denied recognition irrespective of the identity
of the defendant as an American citizen, resident or otherwise.
Also, the courts did not consider whether recognition of the
judgment would abrogate the purposes behind the First
Amendment and "chill" protected expression. 176 An explicit
analysis of the competing interests at stake and the relation of
the judgment to the United States could develop a more useful
and meaningful public policy exception.
In determining whether to apply the public policy exception
to a foreign libel or other speech inhibiting judgment that would
not be tenable under U.S. law, courts should not routinely
refuse enforcement without examining the facts of the specific
case at hand. They should balance First Amendment interests
against interests in maintaining the integrity and purpose of
the Hague Convention, as well as considering the importance of
according a level of respect to Member States that the United
States would itself expect to receive in a foreign forum. 177 In
making this adjudication, a judge should examine the United
States' interests at stake, in light of the purposes of the First
Amendment,178 and the level of the burden on freedom of speech.
If a U.S. interest or party is implicated and the burden on
speech is significant, 79 the judgment should be denied
176. See supra part I.B.2 for a description of the Bachchan and Matusevitch
cases.
177. Although balancing interests tends to sacrifice predictability and is
inherently discretionary, the weighing of various interests pervades Supreme Court
resolution of First Amendment questions. See Koningsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961) ("Throughout its history this Court has
consistently recognized [that] constitutionally protected speech is ... [not] unlimited.
[When] ... constitutional protections are asserted against the exercise of valid
governmental power a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires an
appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved."). Id.
178. See supra notes 6, 45-47 and accompanying text (explaining the purposes
behind the free speech clause of the First Amendment).
179. Ambiguity inheres in words like "significant," but the Court has used this
term and others like it ("compelling," "important," "substantial") frequently to assess
the relative government interests advanced in various cases. See Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972) ("may be necessary to further significant government
interests"); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 119 (1991) ("undisputed compelling interest"); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) ("if it furthers an important or substantial government
interest"). "Significant" is sometimes used when the Court is exercising intermediate
scrutiny, when there are important interests to balance on both sides of the issue.
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding that the
ordinance regulating noise level in Central Park was "narrowly tailored to serve a
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recognition as manifestly incompatible with the public policy of
the United States.
The Bachchan and Matusevitch cases illustrate how this
analysis should work.180 In Bachchan, the party held liable for
defamation in Britain was a New York publisher whose
allegedly libelous article was circulated in the United States in
addition to Britain and India.18' American interests were
therefore directly affected by the adverse judgment. Allowing
the judgment to be enforced against the U.S. publisher could
easily, as the court noted, deter future publication of
controversial speech, thereby defeating one of the fundamental
purposes of the First Amendment. 8 2 Since the periodical at
issue was disseminated in the United States as well as abroad,
such a chilling effect could deprive not just the newspaper
owner of the right to free publication, but the public at large of
access to information of international import. 8 3
Secondly, the speech at issue concerned and criticized the
Indian government,'84 and such scrutiny of authority is deemed
to be a central purpose of the First Amendment. 8 5 Because such
criticism of government and politics is "core" speech, exacting a
penalty on its dissemination without requiring the application of
the stringent standards imposed by the United States
constitution amounts to a serious and significant burden on free
expression in this country.
Other member states may argue that criticism of foreign
governments and affairs intended for a foreign audience has no
bearing on American interests or Constitutional freedoms and
should not concern the courts. 8 6  With the increasing
globalization of society, however, leaders of foreign nations
interact constantly and take a number of actions that directly
impact the United States and should be made known to citizens.
Further, as mentioned above, because the defendant was a U.S.
significant government interest").
180. See supra part I.B.2 for a description of these British libel cases.
181. See Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 661
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1992).
182. See id. at 664.
183. See id. ("the wire service report was related to an international scandal
which touched major players in Indian politics and was reported in India, Sweden,
the United States, England and elsewhere in the world.").
184. See id.
185. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
186. See generally Devgun, supra note 34, at 203 ("Recognition or non-
recognition would not affect freedom of speech in the United States, because [the
publication of the allegedly defamatory story] occurred in England").
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resident, it is quite conceivable that enforcement of this and
similar judgments would chill speech by international
publishers on hotly debated issues. 187 Enforcement in some
situations could also force small press organizations out of
business due to the financial burden that can result from even a
single finding of defamation liability. 188 Such results are not
acceptable under the First Amendment, and thus the Buchanan
court was correct in refusing to honor the British damages
award.
In contrast, in the Matusevitch case, the punished speech
was a letter, written and published solely in Britain. 8 9 At the
time of the suit, both parties to the libel action were residents of
the United Kingdom who emigrated from Russia. 190 Though the
publication concerned human rights issues and political
activists, both matters of public concern, the expression in this
case simply had no relation to the United States other than the
fact that the defendant had moved to Maryland for his job.191 As
a new inhabitant of the United States, Matusevitch can now
freely express his political opinions within the confines of
American defamation standards. 192 Therefore, recognition of the
British award would not impermissibly deter this
constitutionally important type of expression and the burden on
free speech in the United States would not be significant. The
court's assertion that enforcement would have deprived him of
his constitutional rights 93 is not accurate because at the time
Matusevitch made the relevant statements in his reply letter to
Telknikoff, he was not a United States resident and thus was
not under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Constitution. 94 Though
British libel laws clearly would not be acceptable under
established First Amendment principles, 195 disagreement with
the wisdom of Britain's choice of laws is not a valid reason to
refuse judgments rendered under such standards. In this case,
the court should have enforced the judgment instead of, in
187. See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
188. The judgment in the Matusevitch case, for example, would have amounted
to $370,800 plus interest. See Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 236 n.9 (Md.
1997).
189. See Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 232-35 (Md. 1997).
190. See id. at 257 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
191. See Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 232.
192. See supra part I.B1.
193. See Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 5,6.
194. See Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 232.
195. See supra parts I.B.1, I.B.2 (outlining differences between U.S. and U.K
defamation law).
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effect, inserting U.S. constitutional requirements into British
law. The case for refraining from applying the public policy
exemption in this situation would be even stronger under the
proposed Hague Convention, as the countervailing interests in
trade relations and fair treaty application would demand
consideration. 196
CONCLUSION
The proposed Hague Convention on International
Jurisdiction and the Effects of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters offers the United States and the world an
opportunity to benefit from a predicable and uniform regime for
dealing with disputes arising from the transnational movement
of goods and persons. Such conformity would promote and
facilitate increased global commerce and cooperation. In order to
secure the certainty required for such a regime, the United
States must consistently honor judgments of foreign nations,
even some that would not be possible to procure under U.S.
constitutional law. The United States must also, however, not
sacrifice the protections of the First Amendment by failing to
exercise any scrutiny over speech abridging judgments, such as
those found in the British libel cases recently addressed in
American courts.
In order not to undermine the efficacy of the proposed
Hague treaty and avoid abuse of its provisions, the government
and courts should require a narrow and strict construction of
the catchall public policy exemption to mandatory enforcement.
At the same time, the system must pay due regard to the
constitutional liberties that supercede the substantive rules of a
treaty. In particular, when faced with foreign libel or hate
speech judgments rendered under standards offending First
Amendment protections, courts should formally analyze the
U.S. interests involved and the burden on the relevant speech as
a means of balancing international trade and domestic
expression issues.
196. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
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